Neues BERG Working Paper No. 180 von Thomas Daske and Christoph March erschienen

In der BERG Working Paper Series 180 wurde von Thomas Daske und Christoph March ein neues Papier mit dem Titel "Efficient Incentives with Social Preferences" veröffentlicht.

Eine Gesamtübersicht aller bisher erschienenen BERG Working Paper finden Sie hier.

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Abstract:

This study explores mechanism design with allocation-based social preferences. Agents’ social preferences and private payoffs are all subject to asymmetric information. We assume quasi-linear utility and independent types. We show how the asymmetry of information about agents’ social preferences can be operationalized to satisfy agents’ participation constraints. Our main result is a possibility result for groups of at least three agents: If endowments are sufficiently large, any such group can resolve any given allocation problem with an ex-post budget-balanced mechanism that is Bayesian incentive-compatible, interim individually rational, and ex-post Pareto-efficient.